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of temperature, called cool and warm." "These fibers regenerate more slowly than those which subserve protopathic sensibility after reunion of a divided nerve, and sensation does not usually begin to return in less than six months under the most favorable conditions. The distribution of these fibers in the larger peripheral nerves, such as the median and ulnar, overlaps little compared with a great overlapping of the protopathic supply." "As soon as a sensory impulse reaches its first junction in the spinal cord, it becomes shunted into tracts devoted to the conduction of impulses grouped in a way different from that found in the peripheral nerves. It is no longer a question of protopathic, epicritic or deep sensibility; the tracts in the central nervous system are devoted to the conduction of impulses concerned with pain, heat, cold and touch."

"The system we have called protopathic in the skin is one with the afferent fibers of the sympathetic as they supply the viscera. In both cases the sensation is badly localized, radiates widely and is frequently referred to parts other than those stimulated. . . . The whole body within and without is supplied by the protopathic system. The fibers of this system in the skin may be spoken of as somatic, those to the internal organs as visceral protopathic fibers. . . . Another set of afferent fibers peculiarly associated with impulses of movement and pressure exist in connection with the Pacinian organs. In the body and limbs, an analogous system is found peculiarly susceptible to pressure, to the localization of movement and to the appreciation of position. The fibers of this system run in conjunction with the motor nerves. In addition to these two systems, which are distributed to all parts of the body within and without, the surface of the body only is supplied by a third system, which we have called epicritic."

This work illustrates well the value of a study of the abnormal for the understanding of normal processes. Not only is normal psychology of value for the understanding of the abnormal, but pathological or abnormal psychology can give new points of view to the student of normal mental life. It is safe to say that the work of Head and his collaborators is the most important contribution to the study of skin and pressure sensation which has appeared in many years.

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The Experience Philosophy. WARNER FITE. *Philosophical Review*, January, 1906. Pp. 1-16.

Professor Fite is convinced that a fundamental fallacy underlies all 'experience-philosophy,' by which term he means any philosophy based exclusively on experience and declaring that the object of consciousness has no real existence apart from its presence in consciousness. His critique is directed, first, against the assumption of the series of experiences as *real* and, second, against the *reality* of the present experience.

The series of experiences, although taken only as a working basis, must still involve a belief that the past fact of experience is in some

way more valid than a past fact which can be inferred, but has not been experienced. The author questions the validity of this belief. According to his analysis, the only difference in the two facts is in the recognition which may attach itself to the past experience, and recognition is found to be only a degree of *clearness* which the image possesses together with the idea that the experience is *mine*, which means that my body is the central figure of the experience. In so far as this distinction signifies anything beyond the degree of clearness, it means that my body is a *reality* apart from experience. The past fact that the tree which I see felled before me once stood, is equally real, and my judgment is reached by the same sort of reasoning from the same sort of premises.

That recognition is a variable phenomenon we must all admit, yet practically we *do* attach greater value to things remembered and recognized than to things unrecognized or inferred, and without departing from the author's own terms, it would seem that a clearly recalled experience might fit into one's scheme of thought more conclusively than would be possible in the case of an inference denied the factor of recognition.

The second point, concerning the reality of the present experience, turns on the question as to what is really 'given' on which one may proceed to build. The present state of consciousness may be largely a matter of sense-perception, so called; it may also be inferential, imaginative or reproductive in nature. Are these all equally 'given,' and, if so, why not build one's world on imaginary as well as on sensational elements? As a matter of fact, one restricts the *real* or 'given' to the perception of objects in the outer world. On what is this distinction of validity based? Here, again, it is merely a matter of clearness, *i. e.*, mechanical relations of my body and other bodies, and if this means anything beyond additional associations it means a reality outside my own consciousness.

Now it is freely admitted that this step from conscious object to object of consciousness is not easy. Indeed, nothing less than the problem of knowledge is here involved. But, questions the author, is there any more reason for throwing away the tree which inference tells me produced the sensation, than the man in whom it was produced? In so far as the distinction subject-object is valid, the series is valid. But neither is an *ultimate*. Indeed, the search for an ultimate is an *ignis fatuus*. There is no such thing. How can one conceive a foundation stone which supports all, yet which nothing supports? There is not even a logical necessity to search for an ultimate, as most philosophers have wrongly apprehended. Induction and deduction are not two opposed methods, but two phases of one. Let us, then, accept all such data as seem useful, judging validity by usefulness. It is not a firm foundation that we need strive for, but a democracy of data all leading equally well from one to the other—an idea which, by the way, is not new to students of modern positivism.

And so our author concludes we should, 'with the realists, hold that reality is not limited to experience, and that the progress of science

represents . . . an advance in genuine knowledge of an external world; and, with the idealist, we should hold that, nevertheless, *our* objective world is a construction; and, with the pragmatist, that it has been constructed in response to the demands of practical life.'

It is a rather hard pill to swallow, this mixture of realism and idealism. Realism it is, apparently, whenever I take the standpoint of external observer and look at myself and others, idealism it is when *in propria persona* I become the percipient subject. Still, since Professor Fite regards these only as more or less temporary foundations on which he proposes to build—to be consistent he might have said, data which he intends to expand—we can perhaps abide the further question until the structure has been reared, or the field at least surveyed.

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Les états mystiques. BRENIER DE MONTMORAND. *Revue Philosophique*, July, 1905. Pp. 1-23.

In the first ten pages of this article the mystical ecstasy of the *orthodox* mystics is described in four degrees: quietude, union, ecstasy, spiritual marriage. It is the division made by Ste. Theresa in the 'Châteaux Intérieurs.' In the second section (pp. 10-14) are summarized the views of Ribot, Godfernaux, Récéjac and Leuba on ecstasy. In the third and last section (pp. 14-23) Montmorand states his conception and his explanation of the mystical ecstasy.

His first claim is that the psychologists named above 'confuse under the name ecstasy phenomena of very different nature.' He would make the following five classes:

1. Physiological ecstasy, or the ecstasy of philosophers. It is the outcome of hypertrophied attention. Archimedes during the capture of Syracuse is given as an instance.
2. Hypnotic, or Buddhist, ecstasy.
3. Cataleptic ecstasy.
4. Hysteric ecstasy.
5. Mystic ecstasy, of the orthodox mystics.

Although these five kinds of ecstasy show marked external analogies, they have, we are told, evidently no common measure. Physiological ecstasy is characterized by extreme intellectual activity, while Buddhist ecstasy and cataleptic ecstasy are accompanied by loss of consciousness. Hysterical ecstasy 'is made up of hallucinations which follow each other in two alternating tableaux,' while physical ecstasy is devoid of hallucination. We need not stop to examine the adequacy of his classification and the correctness of the accompanying descriptions. Let us simply say that Montmorand did well to remind those of us who treated ecstasy a little too much 'in the lump' of the more or less important differences which exist between its several varieties.

The main thesis of the author is not that there are several sorts of ecstasy, but that the orthodox mystical ecstasy differs essentially and funda-